Carens's analogy highlights the unfairness implicit in being born a citizen of a wealthy country. Like being born into a wealthy family, citizenship acquired in virtue of birth in the territory of, or to parents who are citizens of, wealthy liberal democratic states is, to borrow a phrase from Rawls, "so arbitrary from a moral point of view" and yet so strongly shapes our prospects in life. 2 Based on his interpretations of three leading theories of justice, Carens concludes "there is little justification for restricting immigration" (252). While Carens has clarified and deepened his arguments in response to critics over the years, he has been unwavering in his commitment to the contention that 1 Joseph Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders," The Review of Politics, vol. 49, no. 2 (1987) Carens has done more than any other political theorist or philosopher to develop the normative perspective of prospective migrants from within the liberal democratic tradition, but he has not sufficiently engaged with the other side of the argument. That is, what is at stake for the immigrantreceiving country that might justify its claim to control immigration? In particular, he has not sufficiently explored the value of political community and the principle of collective self-determination. We need a broader normative framework for thinking about migration that takes seriously not only the claims of migrants but also the claims of political community.
This essay proceeds in three parts. First, I examine Carens's theory of social membership and its connection to political community. I then discuss Carens's method of "political theory from the ground up" and his interpretation of democratic principles. I conclude with a discussion of the principle of collective self-determination.
Social membership and political community
An open borders immigration policy is radically utopian so one might associate it with a radical cosmopolitan vision of justice. Cosmopolitans hold that all human beings have equal moral worth and are entitled to equal concern and respect. Radical cosmopolitans hold the further assumption that particular human relationships -to family, friends, and compatriots -never provide independent reasons for action or suffice by themselves to generate special responsibilities. Responsibilities to one's associates are justifiable only if they can be justified by reference to the interests of all human beings viewed as moral equals.
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Yet Carens explicitly distances himself from cosmopolitans who think "the only thing that really matters is the protection of human rights" (161). Instead, he allows for "membership-specific rights" to which only members of a political community are entitled in contrast to "general human rights" to which everyone is entitled. As he emphasizes in the book's conclusion, "Indeed, one of the main messages of this book is that Carens's particularism is reflected in his theory of social membership, which serves as the grounds for many of the claims he makes in the first part of the book for the inclusion of immigrants. The theory consists of both factual and normative claims. As a factual matter, it "evokes the sense that being a member of society involves a dense network of relationships and associations" (164). It is "something that applies to everyone living in a society, whether they can trace their ancestry back several generations or not" (168). Social membership is not based on ancestry or identity but on residence and time spent living in a place. As a normative matter, it serves as the basis for claiming membership-specific rights. It is "normatively prior to" and "more fundamental" than citizenship in the sense that it "provides the foundation upon which moral claims to citizenship normally rest" (160). what is at stake is "a person's ability to maintain and develop a rich and highly particular set of human ties" (164). This sounds like a general human rights claim based on the basic human interest in forming and sustaining relationships wherever we happen to be, but Carens explicitly distinguishes himself from radical cosmopolitans who think that protecting human rights is the only thing that matters. Perhaps he means to focus on the significance of the actual location of our richest relationships. As Carens puts it, "Most people do develop deep and rich networks of relationships in the place where they live, and this normal pattern of human life is what makes sense of the idea of social membership" (168, emphasis added). Yet, the place where we live, the sites where we develop our richest relationships, tend to be local settings -our homes, schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and cities.
I think Carens's theory of social membership is grounded in a theory of political community. Indeed, it has to be -it is the political community, not a social group or network, to which immigrants seek inclusion in the range of cases Carens discusses in the first part of the book. His theory of social membership presupposes the value and moral relevance of the political community. We need to know more about Carens's conception of political community to understand why we should give moral weight to an immigrant's claims of membership and belonging to it. What is special about the relationship among members of a political community as opposed to other kinds of community? There are at least two distinctive features of the relationship among members of a political community: it is typically not voluntary and it involves shared subjection to the coercive power of the state. These two features raise the familiar question of the legitimacy of political authority. Linking the question of political legitimacy to Carens's discussion of immigration gives us a way to justify political community as the ground of social membership: it is not only that noncitizen migrants have "rich networks of relationships in the place where they live" (social membership claim) but also that they are subject to the coercive power of the state under which they live (political legitimacy claim). Walzer's way of doing philosophy was not to seek "an objective and As Carens's list suggests, the content of "democratic principles" in North America and Western Europe is rich and pluralistic. It is also contested and conflicting. He says these core principles could be called "liberal" or "liberal democratic" or "republican" instead of "democratic, but Carens relies more on certain principles over others in the course of his book. In particular, the principles of moral equality and individual rights and freedoms serve as I believe a compelling argument can be developed for the political community's pro tanto right to control immigration, based on the idea of collective self-determination. In contrast to conclusory reasons for action, which require us to act regardless of other considerations in play, pro tanto reasons are "genuine reasons for action," but they do not necessarily override competing reasons that may also be in play. Collective self-determination has an internal and external dimension. Internally, collective self-determination is the idea of popular sovereignty -that a group of people ought to have independent political control over significant aspects of its common life. We can find its external dimension expressed in international law where it used to be viewed as applying only to specific territories -first, the defeated European powers and later, the overseas trust territories and colonies -and it was understood primarily as a right of secession. The idea of collective self-determination has evolved in international law to be understood as a right of all peoples to participate in processes of collective governance.
11
What grounds the principle of self-determination itself? One strategy of justification begins with the premise that is central to Carens's case for open borders -the moral equality of persons -and seeks to derive the value of collective self-determination from it. This strategy anticipates the objection that collective self-determination is inherently incompatible with respecting human rights and responds that self-determination can be derived from the 9 Charter of the United Nations, Article 1, June 26, 1945. 10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966. 11 Thomas M. Franck, "Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," American Journal of International Law, vol. 86 (1992), 54-5. premise that all persons qua persons should be treated with equal concern and respect. This approach is rooted in value individualism: that individual human beings have intrinsic value and that collective entities like the state derive their value from their contributions to the lives of individuals. One might argue that the right of self-determination should be added to the list of basic human rights on the grounds that it is required to respect the moral equality of persons, for one of two reasons. The first is offered by proponents of a human right to democracy: respecting the moral equality of persons requires recognizing a right to democratic self-governance. The claim here is that moral equality requires that all persons be regarded as equal participants in significant political decisions to which they are subject. A second reason starts from the premise of the moral equality of all persons but offers an instrumental argument for recognizing a legal right to democracy in international law: democratic governance is so instrumentally valuable for the protection of human rights that it ought to be required for any government to be considered legitimate.
While I share the value individualism underlying these moral equality arguments, they fail to capture something fundamental about the right of self-determination: it is an irreducibly collective right. The right of selfdetermination is irreducibly collective in at least two senses. First, the agent is a collective agent -"we the people" -that is not reducible to the mere aggregation of individual members of a political community. Second, the freedom of self-determination is a collective freedom. This is what Rousseau called "moral liberty" or "obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself." Moral liberty "alone makes man truly the master of himself" and it is only possible "in the civil state." 12 Rousseau adds another dimension to our understanding of the value of political community: it is only through political community that collective self-determination is possible. The challenge is to provide an account of the relationship of the collective and its individual members such that we can say we have a collective agent that also respects the freedom and equality of individuals.
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My point here is that there is a compelling argument for the state's pro tanto right to control immigration that is based on the principle of collective self-determination. Recognizing such a right is not to say that there should be 'closed borders' instead of 'open borders' but rather that members of the political community have the right to shape the terms of membership and belonging within constraints, which are themselves defined by democratic principles. We can appeal to the sorts of considerations that Carens himself raises in the first part of the book to develop an account of the constraints on state regulation of borders. In contrast with Carens who moves in the second part of his book to reject the presupposition of legitimate state control over immigration, I think we can defend the state's right to control immigration while also arguing that the right should exercised in ways that allow for the admission of refugees and others fleeing violence and war, family reunification policies, the legalization of irregular migrants, and other policies that Carens defends in the first part of the book.
I greatly admire the clarity, rigor, and wide-ranging scope of Carens's book. And given how controversial and complicated a topic immigration is, I also admire how he wrote the book not only for a scholarly audience but also for "ordinary men and women in North America and Europe who think of themselves as people who believe in democracy and individual rights and who want to understand the challenges posed by immigration into their societies" (3). I think the first part of Carens's book is a model of democratic persuasion. In addressing ordinary men and women in North America and Europe, he implicitly accords a kind of standing to 'we the people' in democratic political communities as having the power to shape the future of their communities. If we take seriously the principle of collective selfdetermination, we are able to see that this power is not merely a convention but a legitimate power of 'we the people.'
